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Jessica M. Erickson†
The being within, communing with past ages, tells me that once, nor
until lately, there was no white man on this continent; that it then all
belonged to red men, children of the same parents, placed on it by
the Great Spirit that made them, to keep it, to traverse it, to enjoy its
productions, and to fill it with the same race, once a happy race,
since made miserable by the white people who are never contented
but always encroaching.1

I. INTRODUCTION
The philosophies of Michel Foucault have long been applied to various cultures and social movements in hopes of gaining insight into how
power operates within a societal framework.2 One philosophy, Foucault’s conception of “biopolitics,” refers to the state’s regulatory control
over the population as a whole, or its ability to control the life and death
of the citizenry.3 Instead of exercising power at the level of each individual, “biopower”4 is exercised on the level of the population; it is the
power to make live and let die.5
†

J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., Philosophy and Religious Studies,
B.A., Law and Justice, Central Washington University, 2003. The author would like to thank the
members of the Seattle University Law Review, especially Gabriella Wagner, James Beebe, Micol
Sirkin, and Colin Prince. The author would also like to thank her family for their constant and unending support.
1. See JOHN SUGDEN, TECUMSEH: A LIFE 22, 374–75 (1997). Tecumseh (born in March 1768
and died on October 5, 1813) was a famous Native American leader of the Shawnee.
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE 1975–1976, (Mauro Bertani et al. eds., David Macey trans., 2003) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
SMBD].
3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 139, 143 (Robert
Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY]; see also FOUCAULT,
SMBD, supra note 2, at 243.
4. The terms “biopolitics” and “biopower” are used somewhat interchangeably within Foucault’s philosophies, but basically, biopolitics is the style of government that regulates populations
through biopower—the impact of political power on all aspects of human life.
5. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 241.
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Indian6 nations have been battling for sovereignty—freedom from
external control in determining the direction of their life—since the
founding of this country.7 Throughout its relatively short history, the
United States has espoused a number of varying policies directed towards Native Americans and tribal culture.8 These policies, manifested
through various congressional acts and case law, have had differing impacts on native culture.
One noteworthy example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),9 which despite its noble purpose,10 has proven to have a negative effect on tribal culture. The Ninth Circuit has erected hurdles that
tribes must face in order to establish a valid claim under the RFRA. Beginning with its ruling in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,11 the
Ninth Circuit has consistently denied tribes’ claims under the RFRA because evidence of “damaged spiritual feelings” is insufficient to prove
that practice of their religion was substantially burdened.12
This Note explores the connection between the philosophy of Michel Foucault and current Ninth Circuit sacred site cases, primarily Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service.13 Part II of this Note discusses Foucault’s philosophies on biopower. Part III briefly explores the evolution
of federal Indian policy. Part IV provides background on Native American religions and their connection to the land. Part V outlines the Ninth
Circuit’s legal framework for protecting native religions. Part VI concludes the Note, arguing that the test developed from Navajo Nation
should be reconsidered because of its biopolitical effect on Native American populations. In its place, a new test should be implemented that
takes into consideration the unique character of the link between native
religion and the land.

6. This Note uses the terms “Native American,” “Indian,” and “native” interchangeably as each
term is considered to be politically acceptable.
7. An indepth analysis of what sovereignty means in the context of federal Indian law is
beyond the scope of this Note. It is sufficient to observe that Indian policy and the definition of
tribal sovereignty has fluctuated through the years. See infra, Part II.
8. For an overview of Federal Indian law, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Lexis Nexis 2005) (1953).
9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107 Stat.
1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)).
10. One declared purpose is to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by the government.” Id.
11. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009).
12. Id. at 1070 n.12.
13. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058.
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II. FOUCAULT AND POWER
Just as the history of Indian policy is relevant to understand how
tribal sovereignty and land ownership has evolved, background on Foucault’s theories of power is necessary to understand how this power is
experienced in the Native American context. Because of the strong link
between Native American culture and the land, regulations affecting the
land inevitably affect the native populations themselves. Foucault’s
theories provide a framework from which we can criticize regulation14
affecting Native American sacred sites. Moreover, the nature of Foucauldian power explains how entire populations can be affected, or even
eliminated, by certain types of legal or political decisions.
Michel Foucault, noted philosopher, historian, critic, and sociologist, is widely known for his work on power and the relationships between power, knowledge, and discourse. Foucault taught at the Collège
de France from January 1971 until his death in June 1984.15 In a series
of lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 1975 and 1976, Foucault
addressed the function of racism in the state and the specific techniques
of power associated with it. In his concluding lecture, he considered two
different powers he had undertaken to study in the course.
The first was the power of the sovereign: from the early modern period, the power embodied by the sovereign was a “right of life and death”
over his subjects—the right to “take life or let live.”16 The seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries saw the emergence of techniques of power that
were centered on the individual body, such as torture and the modern
penal system.17 However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a
new technology of power emerged, which modified the disciplinary
power and expanded it beyond the realm of the individual.18 As Foucault
explained, “[u]nlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new
nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living
man, to man-as-living-being. . . . [T]o man-as-species.”19 This man-asspecies power did not, like discipline, try to control by ruling a “multiplicity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dissolved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained,
14. The term “regulation” is used loosely to describe any legislative act, administrative regulation, or case law.
15. With the exception of 1977 (when he was on sabbatical). His chair was in the History of
Systems of Thought. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at ix.
16. Id. at 241.
17. See id. at 242. This focus on the individual is most closely associated with Foucault’s work
with disciplinary power and the emergence of modern penitentiaries. See generally MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
18. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 242.
19. Id.
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used, and, if need be, punished.”20 Rather, this new power is established
to address a multiplicity of men “not to the extent that they are nothing
more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the
contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic
of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.”21 It is this “massifying”
and not “individualizing” power which Foucault called the “biopolitics
of the human race.”22
While disciplinary power is applied on an individual level to train
and make use of the body, the second kind of power functions on a different scale and is implemented in a very different way.23 This power,
called biopower, is applied to the human species through a biopolitical
form of government.24 According to Foucault, biopower emerged during
the eighteenth century as a result of the rapid growth of various disciplines and regulations designed to control burgeoning populations.25 Such
power reduced life into a series of exacting calculations by the state and
assigned knowledge as the power to transform human life.26 The subject
of the state’s calculations increasingly became the life and death of the
population as a whole, as opposed to specific individuals.27
It is this slow evolution away from using political power to control
the individual, to “take life or let live,” and towards the impact of political power on all aspects of human life that Foucault describes as the
“right to make live and to let die.”28 Another way to view this is to look
at it as the contrast between an epidemic and an endemic. Instead of an
epidemic, which suddenly causes more frequent deaths, an endemic has
permanent characteristics and factors that often work over time, that is,
“illness as phenomena affecting a population.”29

20. Id.
21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. Biopolitics referred to the state’s regulatory control over the population as a whole—
“the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological process.” See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 139; see also
FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 243, 247 (With “the emergence . . . of this technology of power
of ‘the’ population as such, over men insofar as they are living beings . . . we have the emergence of
a power that [Foucault called] the power of regularization.”).
23. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 242.
24. Id. Foucault also refers to this type of power as biopower in The History of Sexuality.
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 143 (“applied not to man-as-body [as
disciplinary power is], but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately . . . to man-asspecies.”).
25. See Joshua E. Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 171, 174 (2007).
26. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3.
27. Id. at 140.
28. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 241.
29. Id. at 244.
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While biopolitics most obviously concerns population-level health
regulation and policy, it also encompasses environmental regulation.
Foucault explained that control over the human species is also exercised
by control over its environment, the “milieu in which they live.”30 This
includes direct effects on geographical, climatic, or hydrographic environment, including “the problem of the environment to the extent that it
is not a natural environment.”31 Basically, when you control a population’s environment, you control the population.
Foucault’s philosophy on biopower has primarily been connected to
scholarship in the medical field and the field of health regulation.32
However, any time a regulation, a court ruling, or even a social norm
affects the ability to live, Foucault’s ideas apply. The exercise of biopower to “compel conformity and its tendency to oppress and alienate
results in political struggles and strategies that manifest in culture wars
over one’s ‘right’ to life (and to death), to health, to happiness, to one’s
body, and ‘to rediscovery of what one is and all that one can be.’”33 This
right to rediscover oneself and determine specific opinions and
worldviews includes religion. Therefore, within the Native American
context, regulation of the land, manifested through judicial holding, has a
biopolitical effect on life because individual and tribal identity are inseparably connected with what is being regulated—the land.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY
Federal Indian policy has a long and varied history in the United
States.34 Occasionally, sentiments focus on tribes as inherent sovereign
bodies associated with a particular geographical base protected by the
federal government.35 However, the dominant policy has been to completely disseminate tribes and assimilate their members into non-Indian
society.36 The tension between these disparate views is still felt in current Indian law cases. For this reason, it is unsafe to presume that federal
Indian policy has settled in one particular direction.37

30. Id. at 245.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 25.
33. Id. at 175 (citing FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 145).
34. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, for a comprehensive overview of federal Indian policy.
35. See the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
36. The aim of the termination policy was, “as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, [and] to end their status as
wards of the United States . . . .” H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
37. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 8, at 10.
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During early colonial times, tribes were viewed as sovereign powers.38 However, as the colonies continued to expand and the American
Revolution came and went, tension grew between Indian and non-Indian
populations, particularly with regard to the land the tribes occupied.39 A
series of cases, known as the “Marshall Trilogy,”40 quickly emerged and
defined tribal sovereignty in relation to land.
The first of the trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh,41 recognized that although the tribes had the right to occupy their land, the federal government could extinguish any title they held. Additionally, the tribes could
alienate their land only to the federal government.42 In effect, the Court
determined that the title the Indians held (“Indian title” or “aboriginal
title”) was held only at the sufferance of the federal government,43 and
that, by purchase or conquest, this title could be taken away.44
Following M’Intosh, the Court further tailored the concept of tribal
sovereignty in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.45 Chief Justice Marshall
determined that the tribes were capable of governing themselves and
their own affairs; however, their sovereignty was not comparable to that
of a foreign nation.46 Rather, Marshall said that their status was that of a
“domestic dependant nation,” which was enclosed entirely within the
United States territory.47 The dependent nation’s relationship with the
United States is like that of a ward to its guardian.48 This is the root of
the “trust responsibility,” a term describing the relationship between the
federal and tribal governments.49
Even more pivotal than Cherokee Nation in affirming tribal sovereignty was Worcester v. Georgia.50 After reviewing treaties made with
the Cherokee, congressional acts, and the course of dealing with the Indians, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Cherokee nation was a
distinct community “occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described.”51 Marshall further asserted that the state’s law could
38. See id. at 10–19. With sovereignty came the right to deal with foreign nations, such as the
British Colonies, and the recognition that Indian tribes held some kind of alienable title to the land
they occupied. Id.
39. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the detailed history of each period.
40. See cases cited supra note 35.
41. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
42. See id. at 573.
43. See id.; COHEN, supra note 8, at 56.
44. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587.
45. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id.
49. COHEN, supra note 8, at 122.
50. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
51. Id. at 520.
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have no force in that territory, reaffirming tribal sovereignty over the
tribe’s own land.52 However, as the West continued to expand and
change, federal Indian policy was forced to change with it.
The expanding West caused federal Indian policy to evolve—by restricting tribes to specific reservations.53 As demand for Indian land increased, justification for acquiring non-Indian lands became necessary.54
The theory of assimilation was used to justify the legislation approving
the acquisition of Indian lands and was heralded as benefitting the Indians.55 Some proponents of assimilation believed that the policy would
aid the absorption of Indian tribes into mainstream society and thereby
cure “savage” tribes of their culture.56
The Indians’ move to the reservations57 was followed shortly by the
Allotment Era. During this period, reservations were broken into smaller
portions and given to individual Indians.58,59 The allotment period continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, when policy shifted
more towards tolerance and respect for the traditional aspects of Indian
culture.60 However, this period of reorganization61 was short-lived. The

52. Id. at 561.
53. COHEN, supra note 8, at 45, 65. Policy shifted from removing the tribes to concentrating
them on fixed reservations. Id. The policy of “concentrating the Indians on small reservations of
land, and of sustaining them there for a limiting period, until they can be induced to make necessary
exertions to support themselves” was first implemented in 1853. Id.; CHARLES E. MIX, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-1, at 357 (1858).
54. COHEN, supra note 8, at 45.
55. Id. at 77.
56. See id.; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
57. The federal government reserved distinct portions of land on which they would provide
“only sufficient land for their actual occupancy . . . divid[ed] among them in severalty . . . and in lieu
of money annuities . . . stock animals, agricultural implements, mechanic shops, tools and materials,
and manual labor schools for the industrial and mental education of their youth.” COHEN, supra note
8, at 65 (quoting S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-1, at 357). Reservations were, in effect, “schools for civilization” provided to further the goal of assimilation. COHEN, supra note 8, at 65.
58. See generally Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 1934); COHEN, supra note 8, at 75–84. Allotment decreased tribal landholding and surplus
land was often sold to non-Indians. Id.
59. It should be noted that allotment did not always have its intended effect. Indians were not
“transformed into farmers” and the complex scheme of issuing fee patents enabled some Indians to
sell their land but left many Indians landless. COHEN, supra note 8, at 78.
60. COHEN, supra note 8, at 84. The primary catalyst for change was the well-known Meriam
Report. Id.; INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Meriam ed., 1928). This two-year non-governmental study brought public attention to the deplorable
living conditions of tribal peoples. COHEN, supra note 8, at 84. Although the Report reflected some
assimilationist attitudes, it gave greater credence to Indian culture and aimed to develop that which is
good in Indian culture “rather than to crush out all that is Indian.” Id.; see also COMMITTEE OF ONE
HUNDRED, THE INDIAN PROBLEM, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 68-149 (1924).
61. See generally Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)).
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United States soon found itself in the middle of the Great Depression,
followed closely by World War II.62
Shortly after World War II, federal Indian policy made a dramatic
shift towards “termination.” This affected the tribes in two ways.63 First,
termination functioned as an experiment imposed on a small number of
tribes and ended the special relationship64 between those tribes and the
federal government.65 Second, tribes that were not directly terminated
suffered as large amounts of acreage were passed out of Indian hands,
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs was stripped of many of its responsibilities.66
Beginning in 1958, federal Indian policy shifted once again, this
time to promote self-determination and tribal self-governance.67 The
effect of self-determination can be seen in the passage of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968,68 which extends federal constitutional protections to
tribal governments.69 Further, the theme of protecting and extending tribal life can be clearly seen in the vast array of policies, programs, and
legislation that have recently taken shape.70 Encapsulating the spirit of
affirming tribal culture, President Clinton pledged that “our first principle must be to respect your right to remain who you are and to live the
way you wish.”71
One important component of federal Indian law, as opposed to policy, is the emergence of specific canons of construction.72 The canons’
main requirement is that treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians, with any ambiguity
resolved in their favor.73 These canons are grounded in the values of
structural sovereignty, not “judicial solicitude for powerless minorities.”74 Because these canons help mediate problems that are presented
by the nonconsensual inclusion of Indian nations into the United States,

62. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 89.
63. Id. at 89–97.
64. This special relationship refers to the federal trust responsibility. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (recognizing the existence of the federal trust responsibility).
65. COHEN, supra note 8, at 91.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 97–113.
68. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).
69. Prior to the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, constitutional restrictions, including the
Bill of Rights, did not apply to tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
70. COHEN, supra note 8, at 104–05.
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id.; see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); City
of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
74. COHEN, supra note 8, at 123; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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they are helpful in preserving distinct Native American cultures as well
as the tribes’ inherent sovereignty.
IV. RELIGION AND PEOPLEHOOD
The unique character of Native American culture is inextricably
linked to religion.75 As Vine Deloria said, “There is no salvation in tribal
religions apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”76 The continuance of the tribe depends not only on legal recognition of a tribe’s sovereign status,77 but also on continuing access to sites deemed sacred by
the native communities for spiritual activities.78 This Part establishes the
direct link between Native Americans, religion, and the land. It describes how a law or regulation disturbing the use of sacred land can
have the effect of destroying the religion, the culture, and ultimately the
people who use the land for religious purposes.
The survival of a population often depends on religious and cultural
unity within that population. One way of describing such unity of a tribal population is to look at it as “peoplehood,” a concept recently advanced by Kristen Carpenter.79 As Carpenter explains, peoplehood is
“an inclusionary and involuntary group identity with a putatively shared
history and distinct way of life.”80 In addition, “[p]eoplehood is a shared
consciousness and commitment to a group characterized by ‘common
descent—a shared genealogy or geography’ as well as ‘contemporary
commonality, such as language, religion, culture, or consciousness.’”81
Peoplehood has less to do with being generally Indian; rather, it is tribalspecific, relating to particular locations and customs.82 This is contrary
to how most people think about Native Americans; people often fail to

75. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313,
352 (2008).
76. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 194 (1992).
77. Tribal sovereignty is a complex question of Indian law. See generally COHEN, supra note
8. However, for the purposes of this Note, I recognize that biopolitical effect on a tribal group is not
dependent on legal recognition of that tribe.
78. DELORIA, supra note 76.
The Hopi believe that pleasing the Katsinam on the [San Francisco] Peaks is crucial to
their livelihood. Appearing in the form of clouds, the Katsinam are responsible for bringing rain to the Hopi villages from the Peaks. The Katsinam must be treated with respect,
lest they refuse to bring the rains from the Peaks to nourish the corn crop.
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
79. Carpenter, supra note 75.
80. Id. at 348.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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differentiate between the spiritual experiences and belief systems of individual tribal groups.83
Carpenter explains that each tribe often maintains its own religion,
culture, and language, even though similarities may be found with other
tribes.84 Although these traits change over time, tribes can often trace
current religious and cultural practices back to pre-contact times.85 As an
illustration of how historically rich Indian identity is, as well as its deep
connection with the land base, S. James Anaya offers the following specialized definition of “indigenous peoples”:86
They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in
the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the
same lands or in close proximity. Furthermore, they are peoples to
the extent they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of
existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes, or
nations of their ancestral past.87

According to American Indian Studies scholar Tom Holm, there are
four attributes of peoplehood that have helped to ensure the survival of
Indian tribes throughout the devastating eras of conquest, colonization
and forced assimilation.88 They are: (1) maintaining language; (2) understanding place; (3) keeping particular religious ceremonies alive; and (4)
perpetuating a sacred history.89 These categories are interrelated; they
reinforce the idea that sacred sites and American Indian peoplehood are
strongly connected.90 For example, because keeping particular religious
ceremonies alive often means performing them in a particular place, native culture and identity is reinforced when sacred places and observance
of religion meet.
Although the belief systems of individual tribal groups may differ,
Native American belief systems as a whole are clearly distinct from the

83. Martin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the “Free” Exercise of Religion, in NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 19, 65 (John
R. Wunder ed., 1996). Because Native Americans are seen as distinct from Europeans, they are
often grouped together in one unit. However, native religions are as complex and diverse as the
“multiplicity of their cultures suggest.” This plurality is one hurdle that Native Americans face in
the court system.
84. Id. at 56.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 350.
89. Id. (quoting TOM HOLM, THE GREAT CONFUSION IN INDIAN AFFAIRS: NATIVE AMERICANS
& WHITES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, at xiv, xvii (2005)).
90. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 351.
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Western-based religions that permeate American culture.91 One of the
primary differences between the Judeo-Christian tradition and native religions is that Native American spiritual traditions tend to be more spatially oriented, while Judeo-Christian religions are more time-oriented.92
This is not to say that there are no sacred sites within Judeo-Christian
traditions, but rather that there is a stronger focus on specific events in
the course of linear history than on a particular connection to place. For
Native Americans, however, the religious experience is often inseparable
from a particular location.93
This sacredness of place captures the true character of Native
American life.94 As some Indians have described the connections to sacred sites: “[O]ur ancestors arose from the earth here; . . . we make pilgrimages and vision quests here; our gods dwell here; our religion requires that we have privacy here; . . . hence, this sacred site must remain
undisturbed, or we must have unlimited access to this place.”95 In short,
for Native Americans, sacred places are “essential for human survival.”96
Because these sites are essential for human survival, regulations
damaging sites or prohibiting entry seriously affect the lives of both individual Indians and entire tribes. This effect is biopolitical because the
regulation essentially “lets die” the population affected—the native
population.
The importance of place is readily apparent when one dismisses any
preconceived notion that may come from a Western religious mindset
and develops a correct understanding of Native American religions. Unlike Western-based religious identities that may be formed by attending a
variety of places of worship in different locations, Native-based religions
cannot survive apart from the specific places to which they are con91. Although there are many religions observed in the United States, I will focus on the JudeoChristian influence and its contrast with native religion.
92. See Loesch, supra note 83, at 67; see also DELORIA, supra note 76, at 76. Another major
difference between Judeo-Christian religions and native religions is language. “Because the dominant society has not accepted native spirituality on its own terms, all Indian traditions and beliefs
must be translated, in order for their petition to be heard in the American judicial system.” Loesch,
supra note 83, at 66. Other differences include the lack of uniformity among native religions (as
opposed to the sense of orthodoxy in many Western religions) and the mystery surrounding many
native spiritual practices because they are generally conducted privately in remote places. Id. at 67.
93. DELORIA, supra note 76, at 80 (“[r]evelation [is] a particular experience at a particular
place, [with] no universal truth emerging”).
94. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70. For a summary of core features of traditional Native American spirituality, see Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography, in
THE HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 102 (Christopher T. Vescey ed., 1991)
[hereinafter AIRF HANDBOOK].
95. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70 (quoting Christopher T. Vescey, Prologue, in AIRF
HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 12).
96. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70 (quoting AIRF HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 25).
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nected. Because faith is always a part of identity, faith inextricably connected with a particular location means that location is also part of one’s
identity. Thus, laws and regulations affecting that location also affect
one’s identity, even to the point of extinguishing identity completely.
V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The case law dealing with religious freedoms is incredibly varied
and highly complex. Tensions between constitutional principles, such as
the freedom of religion and the Establishment Clause,97 are strong, and
conflicts are not easily resolved. Recently, how Indian religious freedoms are viewed and protected under the Constitution has begun to
change. Specifically, courts have struggled with defining what conduct
constitutes a “substantial burden” on religion and determining the point
at which qualifying conduct must be stopped. The precedent that has
emerged thus far has had a biopolitical effect on Native American populations. By allowing sacred sites to be polluted, the native religious experience is tainted, if not altogether halted. And, because native identity
is inextricably connected with religious experience, damage to the native
religious experience is harmful to collective native identity. Therefore,
new precedent should be developed that takes into account the unique
character of native identity and its link to religion and the land.
This Part first lays the foundation of general federal case law, both
prior to and following the enactment of the RFRA. It then explores the
development of Ninth Circuit precedent, culminating in the creation of
the Navajo Nation test.
A. General Federal Precedent
1. The Pre-RFRA Era
Prior to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the First
Amendment prevents infringement on the exercise of religious beliefs
unless such infringement is justified by a compelling interest that cannot
be achieved through less restrictive means.98 In a 1963 decision, Sherbert v. Verner, the Court first applied a strict scrutiny test, requiring the
government to demonstrate a compelling interest in Free Exercise Clause
cases.99 Appellant Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was fired from her job for refusing to work on Satur-

97. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss either First Amendment or Establishment
Clause issues.
98. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
99. Id.
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days.100 Sherbert subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, but
her request was denied.101 Sherbert brought an action against her employer under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.102 In
finding for the plaintiff, the Court held that “South Carolina may not
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.”103
Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test uses four criteria to determine whether
an individual’s right to free exercise of religion has been violated. A
court must first determine whether the claim involves a sincere religious
belief.104 Next, a court must determine whether the government action
imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of the individual’s religion.105 If the claimant shows a sincere religious belief upon which a
government action imposes a substantial burden, the burden of proof
shifts to the government.106 The government must then prove that it is
acting in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and that it has
pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive to religion.107
The Court reaffirmed the Sherbert test in the 1972 case Wisconsin
v. Yoder.108 In Yoder, three Amish families challenged a law requiring
compulsory school attendance until the age of sixteen.109 Appellants argued that the law violated their religious belief that formal education
should not be required past the eighth grade.110 By applying the Sherbert
100. Id. at 399. Seventh-Day Adventists believe “[t]he fourth commandment of God’s unchangeable law requires the observance of this seventh-day Sabbath as the day of rest, worship, and
ministry . . . .” Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Fundamental Beliefs, http://www.adventist.org
/beliefs/fundamental/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). For Seventh-Day Adventists, Saturdays
are observed as the Sabbath.
101. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 410.
104. In Sherbert, the sincerity of appellant’s religious beliefs was not in dispute. Id. at 399 n.1.
105. There was clearly a burden imposed in Sherbert. The appellant was
force[d] . . . to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 404.
106. Id. at 406–09; Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
107. South Carolina did not meet its burden, and the Court declared the action unconstitutional.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–10.
108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
109. Id. at 207.
110. The Court explained that
[the petitioners] object to the high school, and higher education generally, because the
values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life;
they view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a
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test, the Court determined that the Wisconsin law violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the State did not meet its
burden of showing with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting
an exemption to the Amish.111
The Sherbert test was sharply curtailed in Employment Division v.
Smith, when the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not prohibit burdens on religious practices if they are
imposed by laws of general applicability.112 The Court sidestepped
Sherbert and Yoder by characterizing such cases as “hybrid” decisions
invoking multiple constitutional interests and held that facially neutral
laws would no longer be subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.113
In direct response to Smith, Congress quickly enacted the RFRA.114
Congress opined that the Smith decision “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion,” and that “the compelling interest
test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”115 Congress declared the purposes of the RFRA
are to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by the government” and to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”116 The RFRA was quickly passed unanimously in the House of
Representatives and gained all but three votes in the Senate.117

‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish society emphasizes informal learningthrough-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than
technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from,
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210–11.
111. Id. at 234–36.
112. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The respondents
in Smith were members of the Native American Church and were fired for using peyote during a
religious ceremony, which was prohibited under Oregon law. The respondents were subsequently
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Id.
113. Id. at 881–82.
114. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 437 (1994).
115. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107
Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2006)).
116. Id. § 2(b), 107 Stat. at 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)).
117. Eisgruber, supra note 114, at 438.
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As it currently stands, the RFRA prohibits the federal government118 from substantially burdening “a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b).”119 Subsection (b) states: “[the] Government
may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of
a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”120 However, as with
most congressional acts, determining the language of the Act is only the
beginning. The years following the enactment of RFRA saw much dispute over what it means to substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion.
2. The Post-RFRA Era
By enacting the RFRA, Congress restored the compelling interest
standard and pre-Smith case law. However, the force of the standard was
soon limited by restraints on its applicability. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,121 a case concerning a Native
American sacred site, the Court determined that only governmental action that placed a substantial burden on religious exercise had to meet the
compelling interest standard.122 Lyng concerned a proposal by the United States Forest Service to build a six-mile stretch of paved road through
the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest.123 In preparation for an environmental impact statement, the Forest Service commissioned a study, which determined that the area had historically been
used by certain American Indians for religious rituals that rely upon privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.124 The commissioned
study also determined that “the entire area is significant as an integral
and indispensible part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice.”125 The study recommended that the road not be completed because
118. In the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional
as applied to state and local governments because it exceeded Congress’s authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 521 U.S. 507, 529, 534–35 (1997) (finding that RFRA basically
changes the substantive meaning of the Establishment Clause and holding that Section 5 grants
remedial powers only). However, the Court did not invalidate RFRA as applied to the federal government. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2002). For purposes of this
Note, it is pertinent only that RFRA applies to federal causes of action.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006).
120. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
121. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 442–52.
124. Id.
125. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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constructing a road along any of the available routes “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral
and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.”126 However, the Forest Service declined to adopt
the recommendation.127 Instead, it selected a route that avoided archeological sites and was far removed from the sites used by contemporary
Indians for spiritual activities, but that still traversed land having ritualistic value.128
After exhausting their administrative remedies, several individual
Native Americans, various organizations, and the State of California
challenged both the road-building and timber-harvesting decisions in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming that
the Forest Service’s decision violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise
Clause.129 In response, the district court issued a permanent injunction
prohibiting the government from constructing the Chimney Rock road or
putting the timber-harvesting management plan into effect.130 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, concluding that the government had
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the construction of the
road.131 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed.132 Although the
Court acknowledged that the Native Americans’ beliefs were sincere and
that the government’s proposed actions would have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion, the Court disagreed that the burden
on their religious practices was “heavy enough” to violate the Free Exercise Clause.133 The Court stated that precedent has not held “that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult
to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”134
The Court also opined that regardless of the nature of the rights afforded to the Indians, it shall “not divest the Government of its right to
use what is, after all, its land.”135 Although the Court emphasized that
126. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
127. Id. at 443.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (1983).
131. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988).
132. Id. at 458.
133. Id. at 447.
134. Id. at 450–51.
135. Id. at 453. Limiting the federal government’s use of its own land to avoid disrupting
religious ceremonies might violate the Establishment Clause by imposing a “religious servitude” on
the property and subsidizing the religion in question. Id.
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nothing in the opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen, it went on to state, “[h]owever
much we might wish it were otherwise, government simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and
desires.”136 Here, the Court’s inability to recognize the difference between cultural identity and personal autonomy is problematic and highlights the need for a correct understanding of collective tribal identity.
B. Ninth Circuit Precedent
As discussed in Part IV, Native American religions are inextricably
connected with the land, unlike many Western religions. The San Francisco Peaks, located in Arizona’s Coconino National Forest, are considered one of the most revered mountains by the Hopi and Navajo religious cultures.137 To the Hopi, “the Peaks are the home of the Kachinas,
spiritual beings who assist the Creator as his emissaries to humanity.”138
The Peaks are an essential element of many religious ceremonies, including annual pilgrimages by Hopi elders and other tribal members.139 The
Kachina Peaks are the most sacred place for the Hopi, serving as both a
destination for major pilgrimages and the residence of Hopi gods.140
To the Navajos, the Peaks are one of four mountains marking the
boundaries of the Dinetah, the sacred Navajo homeland.141 The Navajo
people have always had “a spiritual obligation to stay within their ho-

136. Id. at 452–53. The Court emphasized that the First Amendment must apply to all citizens
alike, stating “it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free
exercise of religion.” Id. at 452.
137. BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED LAND 61 (1999). The Peaks are not only held sacred by the
Hopi and the Navajo, but also the Havasupai Tribe, the Yavapai-Apache Nation, the Hualapai Tribe,
and others. See also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
138. BROWN, supra note 137, at 61.
139. Id. at 61–62.
140. Id. Brown states:
For some six months of the year, the Kachinas travel to the Hopi villages and participate
with the tribe in the various religious ceremonies and rituals referred to as the Kachina
cycle. Then, beginning in late July or early August and extending through mid-winter,
the Kachinas return to the Peaks for the next six months and take up residence. The Hopi
people believe that the Kachinas’ activities on the peaks give rise to the rain and snow
storms that nurture the villages with life-sustaining water and food and thus, their happiness, health and well-being. No other place is more sacred than the Kachina Peaks,
which is the object of annual pilgrimages by Hopi elders and other tribal members who
deposit prayer offerings of eagle feathers, turquoise, and other ritual objects at innumerable sites.
Id.
141. Id. at 62. See also Carpenter, supra note 75.
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meland, care for it, and revere their sacred mountains.”142 The Peaks are
especially “revered as the physical embodiment of one of the Holy Ones
or Navajo gods, with various parts forming the head, shoulders, and
knees of a body reclining and facing to the east, and the trees, plants,
rocks, and earth making up the skin.”143 “The Navajos pray to the peaks
as a living, sacred being to whom they are intimately related.”144 The
Peaks connect Navajos to their origins as a people and “reflect sacred
histories, both ancient and modern.”145
As a result of the Peaks’ importance, many claims have been
brought over the years alleging interference with religious freedom. The
first of these decisions, Wilson v. Block,146 set the stage for what would
become decades of litigation over use of the Peaks, ultimately culminating in Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service.
1. Wilson v. Block
In 1937, a 777-acre portion of the San Francisco Peaks, designated
the Arizona Snowbowl, was set aside for recreational skiing and the construction of a ski lodge.147 The original lodge was destroyed by fire in
1952 and in 1956 a new lodge was constructed.148 In 1958, a Poma lift
was installed, as was a chairlift in 1962.149 The following fifteen years
saw very little change in the facilities.150
In April 1977, the U.S. Forest Service transferred the permit to operate the Snowbowl skiing facility from Summit Properties, Inc., to the
Northland Recreation Company.151 In July 1977, Northland submitted to
the Forest Service a “master plan” for the future development of the
Snowbowl, which included the construction of additional parking, new
142. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 352.
143. BROWN, supra note 137, at 62.
144. Id.
145. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 353. For example, according to the Navajo creation story, the
Peaks were the home of the first woman, Changing Woman. Changing Woman, the mother of twins
who are the ancestors of the Navajo people, experienced her kinaalda coming-of-age ceremony on
the Peaks, and young Navajo women continue to celebrate their own kinaalda ceremonies today. Id.,
see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). An example of a modern societal
history is the “Long Walk,” the federal government’s forceful relocation of the Navajos from their
homeland to a prison camp at Bosque Redondo. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 353. This period, from
1864 to 1868, was a defining time in Navajo history; it signified a desire and longing to return to the
homeland, marked by the San Francisco Peaks. Id.
146. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
147. Id. at 738.
148. Id.
149. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1030.
150. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
151. Id.
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lodges, expanded ski slopes, and more ski lifts.152 Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, the Forest Service identified six feasible plans that represented the spectrum of public opinion.153 Between
June 23 and September 30, 1978, the Forest Service solicited public opinion on a draft Environmental Impact Statement based on the six plans
and made special efforts to solicit views from the Hopis and the Navajos.154 On February 27, 1979, the Forest Service issued a decision to
permit moderate development of the Snowbowl.155
Due to the sacredness and the prominence of the Peaks, the Navajo
Medicinemen’s Association, the Hopi tribe, and nearby ranch owners
filed several claims, including one under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment in 1981.156 The plaintiffs sought to “halt . . . further
development of the [Snowbowl] and the removal of existing ski facilities.”157 The Navajo and the Hopi felt “that development of the Peaks
would be a profane act and an affront to the deities, and as a result, the
Peaks would lose their healing power and otherwise cease to benefit the
tribes.”158
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court
and concluded that the government had not unconstitutionally burdened
the tribes’ religious practices or beliefs.159 The court also held that
“plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government’s
proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not be
performed at any other site.”160 Although the plaintiffs established the
general indispensability of the Peaks to the practice of their religion, they

152. Id.
153. Id. These alternatives ranged from complete elimination of artificial structures in the
Snowbowl to full development as proposed by Northland. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 739. The plan selected was not one of the six alternatives previously presented.
The plan allowed the clearing of 50 acres of forest for new ski runs, instead of the 120 acres requested by Northland. The plan also authorized construction of a new day lodge, improvement of
restroom facilities, reconstruction of existing chair lifts, construction of three new lifts, and the paving and widening of the Snowbowl road. Id.
156. Id. Other claims were brought under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the
Establishment Clause, the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and 16 U.S.C. §§ 497, 551. The district court granted the defendant’s summary
judgment on all claims except the claim brought under the National Historic Preservation Act.
157. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739.
158. Id. at 740. “As relief, the Navajos and Hopis sought a phased removal of all artificial
structures on the Peaks, or, at the least, an injunction against further development of the Snow
Bowl.” Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 744. The court clarified that such proof would not necessarily establish a burden of
free exercise, but that the First Amendment, at a minimum, required such proof. Id. at 744 n.5.
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failed to show the particular indispensability of the Snowbowl area.161
Further, the Forest Service did not deny the plaintiffs access to the Peaks,
but rather permitted free entry onto the Peaks and did not interfere with
their ceremonies or the collection of ceremonial objects. 162 Therefore,
the court determined that the plaintiffs had not proven that expansion of
the ski area would prevent them from performing ceremonies or obtaining ceremonial objects unique to the Snowbowl area.163
2. Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service
In the years following the Wilson decision, many of the improvements authorized by the Forest Service were implemented.164 In 2002,
the current owners of the Snowbowl, Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited
Partnership, submitted a proposal to implement snowmaking at the facility using “A+ reclaimed water,” which is treated sewage effluent.165 In
February 2005, the Forest Supervisor issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision.166 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced litigation alleging that the Forest Service had failed to
comply with the requirements of the RFRA.167
Noting that the ski area constituted only about one percent of the
Peaks’ 74,000 acres of public land and that the area proposed for snowmaking was only approximately one quarter of one percent of the Peaks,
the district court found that the Snowbowl upgrades did not interfere
with or inhibit any of the plaintiffs’ religious practices.168 Although the
court found that the Peaks were sacred to the plaintiff tribes, and crucial
to their way of life, it found that the evidence “adduced at trial demon161. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (D. Ariz. 2006), rev’d, 479
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2763 (2009).
165. Id. A+ reclaimed water “is the highest grade of reclaimed water recognized under Arizona statutes and regulations. Class A+ reclaimed water has been approved for use in snowmaking by
the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality.” Id. at 887.
166. The Record of Decision approved, in part: (a) approximately 205 acres of snowmaking
coverage throughout the area, utilizing reclaimed water; (b) a 10 million-gallon reclaimed water
reservoir near the top terminal of the existing chairlift and catchments pond below Hart Prairie
Lodge; (c) construction of a reclaimed water pipeline between Flagstaff and the Snowbowl with
booster stations and pump houses; (d) construction of a 3,000 to 4,000 square foot snowmaking
control building; (e) construction of a new 10,000 square foot guest services facility; (f) an increase
in skiable acreage from 139 to 205 acres—an approximate 47% increase; and (g) approximately 47
acres of thinning and 87 acres of grading, stumping, and smoothing. Id. at 871.
167. Id. The plaintiffs also brought claims under NEPA, NHPA, ESA, the Grand Canyon
National Park Enlargement Act, the National Forest Management Act, and trust law (that the Forest
Service failed to comply with its responsibilities to the tribes). Id.
168. Id. at 883, 886, 889.
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strates that snowmaking is needed to maintain the viability of the Snowbowl as a public recreational resource.”169 Further, the area proposed for
snowmaking was a marginal percentage of the Peaks and the tribes had
already been using reclaimed water for various purposes.170
In assessing whether a substantial burden was imposed on the Native American exercise of religion, the court found that the plaintiffs had
“failed to present any objective evidence that their exercise of religion
[would] be impacted by the Snowbowl upgrades.”171 Instead of looking
at the effect on the land as a whole, the court focused on whether specific
areas or ceremonies would be impacted.172 The court further found that
the plaintiffs had neither met the “coercion” requirement of pre-Smith
case law, nor had they demonstrated that their religious activity had been
penalized.173 Therefore, as a matter of law, the district court held that the
Forest Service’s authorization of upgrades to the ski area was not a violation of the RFRA.174 The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in part, holding that the use of recycled wastewater on the
Snowbowl violates the RFRA.175 The court found two substantial burdens for the Navajo and the Hopi plaintiffs.176 The first burden was “the
inability to perform a particular religious ceremony, because the ceremony requires collecting natural resources from the Peaks that would be too
contaminated—physically, spiritually, or both—for sacramental use.”177
169. Id. at 907. This finding affirms the Forest Service’s determination that improvements to
Snowbowl would enable the ski area to provide a safe, reliable, and consistent operating season. Id.
The court recognized that both the protection of public safety and management of public land for
recreational uses are compelling governmental interests. Id. at 906.
170. Id. at 898. Reclaimed water was used by many of the plaintiff tribes for irrigation, dust
control, and soil compacting. Id. In addition, waste from reservation medical clinics was disposed
of on what was considered Navajo sacred land. Id.
171. Id. at 905 (finding that “[t]he subjective views and beliefs presented at trial, although
sincerely held, are not sufficient for the proposed project to constitute a substantial burden under
RFRA on the practice of religion by any Plaintiff or any members of any Plaintiff tribe or nation.”).
Id.
172. The court explained that the plaintiffs did not identify any plants, springs, or natural resources, or any shrines or religious ceremonies that would be affected by the Snowbowl upgrades.
Id.
173. Id. at 905. “The Legislature intended for courts to look to pre-Smith cases when applying
RFRA and thus the court’s finding of no coercion was tantamount to its holding that there was no
substantial burden here.” S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1989; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
174 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (D. Ariz. 2006).
175. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc,
535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).
176. Id. at 1043. The court did not need to decide whether there was a substantial burden on
the other tribes because it found one for the Navajo and the Hopi. Id. at 1034.
177. Id. at 1039.
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The second burden was “the inability to maintain daily and annual religious practices comprising an entire way of life, because the practices
required belief in the mountain’s purity or a spiritual connection to the
mountain that would be undermined by the contamination.”178
Unlike the district court, which held that the tribes had not presented any objective evidence of a substantial burden, the Ninth Circuit
went into great detail to describe the religious practices of the involved
tribes, emphasizing the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.179 In particular, the
court highlighted the belief that the mountains are a living being, and
contamination of one portion would contaminate the whole.180
Finding a substantial burden, the court proceeded to the remaining
steps of the RFRA’s compelling interest test.181 The court rejected the
argument that the Snowbowl upgrades were in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means because it was unwilling to hold that “authorizing the use of artificial snow
at an already functioning commercial ski area in order to expand and improve its facilities . . . is a governmental interest ‘of the highest order.’”182 The tribes’ interest in sustaining their religious identity had
been validated. The victory, however, was short-lived.
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit took the case en banc to revisit the panel’s decision and to clarify the court’s interpretation of substantial burden
under the RFRA.183 The court reversed the panel’s decision and affirmed
the district court’s denial of relief.184 Emphasizing the preeminence of
pre-Smith decisions, the court held that under the RFRA, a substantial
burden is imposed only where individuals are forced to choose between
following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (e.g., Sherbert) or are coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs
by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (e.g., Yoder).”185 If a burden
imposed falls short of the situations described in Sherbert and Yoder, it is
not a substantial burden and therefore does not require application of the
compelling interest test.186 Because neither situation applies in Navajo

178. Id.
179. Id. at 1039–42.
180. Id. at 1034–38. It is important to note that the panel did not address the lower court’s
finding that waste water was already being disposed of on the Navajo reservation. See supra text
accompanying note 170.
181. See Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1033–34.
182. Id. at 1044.
183. Id. at 1067.
184. Id. at 1063.
185. Id. at 1070.
186. Id. The dissent emphasized, however, that Congress intended courts to apply the compelling interest test to all RFRA cases. Instead of seeing Sherbert and Yoder as definitive examples of
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Nation, the court determined that the compelling interest test was erroneously applied.187
The court found that the “only effect of the proposed upgrades is on
the [p]laintiffs’ subjective, emotional religious experience. . . . [I]t will
spiritually desecrate a sacred mountain and will decrease the spiritual
fulfillment they get from practicing their religion on that mountain.”188
The court further noted that “for all the rich complexity that describes the
profound integration of man and mountain into one, the burden of the
recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the [p]laintiffs as damaged
spiritual feelings. Under Supreme Court precedent, government action
that diminishes subjective spiritual fulfillment does not ‘substantially
burden’ religion.”189 As the en banc court noted, the undue burden in
Yoder was not the effect of secular education on children’s subjective
religious sensibilities, but rather the penalty of criminal sanctions for
parents refusing to enroll their children in secular school.190 Further, the
court emphasized that in Sherbert, the protected interest was the receipt
of unemployment benefits and not the right to take a religious rest on
Saturday.191 However, the dissent fervently objected to the majority’s
interpretation of substantial burden, listing multiple reasons why the majority was wrong in considering Sherbert and Yoder.192
First, the dissent criticized the majority’s approach as inconsistent
with the plain language meaning of substantial burden.193 Second, the
dissent stated that the RFRA does not incorporate any pre-RFRA definition of substantial burden.194 Even if it did, the dissent argued, the cases
on which the majority relies “did not state that interferences with the exercise of religion constituted a ‘substantial burden’ only when imposed

when the compelling interest applies, the dissent views them as illustrative examples. Id. at 1089
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1070.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1070 n.12.
190. Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (“The impact of the compulsoryattendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for
the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under the threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts
undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”).
191. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070 n.12; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963)
(“This holding . . . reaffirms a principle that . . . no State may exclude . . . the members of any . . .
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
193. Id. According to the dissent, substantial burden has a plain and ordinary meaning that
“does not depend on the presence of a penalty or deprivation of benefit.” Id.
194. Id.
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through the two mechanisms used in Sherbert and Yoder.”195 Further,
the RFRA was designed to expand rather than contract protection for
religious exercise; it creates a legally protected interest in the exercise of
religion.196,197
Debate lingers regarding exactly what substantial burden means.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has already applied the precedent it set in
Navajo Nation.
3. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Just a few months after the Ninth Circuit’s final opinion in Navajo
Nation, the court’s narrow reading of the substantial burden test affected
another sacred site case. In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the Ninth Circuit again applied the requirements of Sherbert and Yoder and held that the Snoqualmie tribe had
failed to demonstrate a substantial burden that would meet the Navajo
Nation standard.198
The subject of the case was the Snoqualmie Falls, a site sacred to
the Snoqualmie tribe. The Falls play a central role in the tribe’s creation
story and are an important location for its religious practices.199 The
tribe performs religious ceremonies at the Falls, including vision
quests—“multi-day events in which individual tribal members seek spiritual contact through meditation, fasting, and bathing in the water below
the Falls.”200
The dispute arose after Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) was
granted a license to continue operation of the Snoqualmie Falls Hydroe-

195. Id. (emphasis added) (highlighting that the RFRA does not state a particular mechanism
by which religion cannot be burdened, but rather a prohibition on government action that has a particular effect on religious exercise).
196. Id. at 1090. The dissent also emphasized that the majority’s approach overrules fourteen
years of contrary circuit precedent and that it is inconsistent with cases applying the RLUIPA. Id. at
1086.
197. On January 5, 2009, the Navajo, the Hopi, and other tribes petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No.
08-846), 2009 WL 46999. A handful of amici filed briefs in support of the petition. See, e.g., Brief
of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. in Support of the Petitioners, Navajo
Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 355746; Brief of Amici Curiae Religious Liberty
Law Scholars in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certriorari, Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No.
08-846), 2009 WL 355748. Only time will tell if the conservative Ninth Circuit test will be applied
nationwide.
198. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir.
2008).
199. Id. at 1211. The tribe believes that the mist generated by the Falls connects the earth to
the heavens and that a power water spirit lives in the plunge pool below the Falls. Id.
200. Id.
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lectric Project, which began in 1975.201 The project consists of “a lowlevel diversion dam located upstream from the Falls, an underground
power plant, and an above-ground power plant downstream from the
Falls.”202 The tribe argued that the continued operation of the hydroelectric project prevented it from having necessary religious experiences in
three ways: the project’s operation deprived the tribe of access to the
Falls for vision quests and other religious experiences, it eliminated the
mist necessary for the tribe’s religious experiences, and it altered the ancient sacred cycle of water flowing over the Falls.”203 However, the argument failed when the court applied the Navajo Nation test. Because
the tribal members would not lose a government benefit or face criminal
or civil sanctions for practicing their religion, the governmental activity
did not impose a substantial burden on the tribal members’ ability to exercise religion.204 Thus, due to the overly restrictive compelling interest
test from Navajo Nation, another Native American tribe has lost full enjoyment of its traditional religion, endangering the tribe’s general wellbeing and peoplehood.
VI. THE BIOPOLITICAL EFFECT OF THE NAVAJO NATION TEST
The overly restrictive compelling interest test from Navajo Nation
should be reconsidered because of the biopolitical effect it has on Native
American populations. Although biopolitics can, at times, lead to a literal taking of life, it can have a more insidious effect on native culture.
Because native identity, both collectively and individually, is so closely
related to land itself, decisions affecting the maintenance and control of
the land affect the survival of the tribes themselves. From the native
perspective, pollution of religious sites will inevitably wipe out the tribes. Because the Navajo Nation decision allows Native American sacred
sites to be polluted, if it continues to stand it may destroy the very existence of the tribes.
Although the en banc court of appeals did not doubt the sincerity of
the tribes’ deeply held religious beliefs,205 it failed to understand that
“damaged spiritual feelings”206 are more than just a subjective religious
experience in the Native American context; damage to spirituality literally threatens the existence of a tribe. In failing to understand that connec201. Id. at 1210.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1213.
204. Id. at 1214.
205. Cf. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009) (discussing at length the plaintiffs’ “subjective, emotional religious experience”).
206. Id.
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tion, the court declined to assign it the proper weight. Greater weight
should be assigned because the character of native religion is inherently
different from the Western-based religions on which the RFRA
precedent is founded.207 Because of crucial differences between Western
and Native American religions, specifically the importance of place, this
precedent is insufficient for an adequate RFRA sacred site test.
Difficult legal and regulatory decisions must inevitably be made,
and one group or another will mostly likely be displeased with the result.
Foucault’s philosophies are helpful because they provide a novel way of
seeing how such decisions affect a population. His concept of biopower
is applicable in the Native American context because, as Kristen Carpenter’s research shows,208 Indian peoplehood is affected by adverse decisions in sacred site cases. Here, by “making live” the expansion of the
Snowbowl resort and the corresponding recreation, the en banc court of
appeals in Navajo Nation is essentially “letting die” the affected tribal
populations.
The test developed from Navajo Nation should be reconsidered because of this biopolitical effect on Native American populations and a
new test that takes into consideration the unique character of the link between native religion and land should be implemented.

207. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
208. See Carpenter, supra note 75.

